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ABSTRACT
This article explores technological systems that dissimulate by design. Examples include
untrustworthy hotel and workplace thermostats, digital applications to spy on workers and family
members, and commercial and law-enforcement systems that surreptitiously collect mobile phone
data. Rather than view such cases as exceptional, I argue that deceptive communication systems are
hidden articulations of normal technological orders. If deception in itself is not the primary problem
with such systems, then transparency alone cannot be the solution. As troubling as institutional
opacity might be, an analysis of deceptive systems reveals more fundamental problems: imbalances
in power and widespread acquiescence to corporate and state efforts to control individuals, groups,
and their data. By moving beyond a quest for (or belief in) technological veracity, scholars could





In the midst of what has been called a “big data revolu-
tion,” critical scholarly attention has understandably
turned to the foreboding implications of this trend for
individual privacy, human autonomy, and social justice
(Lyon 2014; Mosco 2014). If patterns in disparate forms
of data can accurately predict individual or group prop-
erties, then this encourages decision making based on
those predictions. The results could foster massive inva-
sions of privacy and intensified discrimination, all nor-
malized as rational forms of risk management on the
part of individuals and institutions, or these changes
could lead to progressive societal transformations, as the
most vocal utopian-minded supporters of big data
believe (e.g., Mayer-Sch€onberger and Cukier 2013). Big
data is wrapped up in these dystopian and utopian
mythologies (boyd and Crawford 2012), which encour-
age a belief that one’s tastes, behaviors, disease propensi-
ties, beliefs, sexual orientation, racial identity, and
likelihood of personal success or failure can all be read
from the crystal ball of big data; the difference lies in
whether one views this as an enabling or disabling capa-
bility. Either way, the veracity of such predictions made
from data is either unquestioned or seen as beside the
point.
Similarly, marketing discourses about the unreliability
of individual self-reporting reinforce perspectives of the
relative trustworthiness of data derived through techno-
logically mediated processes. Thus, what is known as
“neuromarketing” relies on somatic responses (e.g., heart
rate, pupil dilation, respiration, brain waves), measuring
individuals’ responses to stimuli, such as exposure to a
product, without the need for verbal communication
(Andrejevic 2013; Murakami Wood and Ball 2013). Like-
wise, billboards and store displays are being designed to
track the movement and focus of customers’ eyes, gener-
ating data about individual attention and tastes of which
the person may be completely unaware and therefore
unable to disclose accurately even if he or she were coop-
erative (Owano 2013; Tobii 2015). These developments
signal, on one hand, that people do not have privileged
or reliable access to their internal processes, and, on the
other hand, that “the body does not lie,” provided that
one has the proper instruments to read its somatic
markers and precognitive secrets (Aas 2006). As with
discourses about big data, this suggests that organiza-
tions with access to systems for reading the body may
have greater—and possibly more accurate—knowledge
of one’s preferences or likely behaviors than the individ-
ual in question has. Technologically derived truths, as
such, are not called into question.
Scholars in the field of science and technology studies
have long deconstructed myths of technological neutral-
ity and inevitability (Akrich 1992; Bowker and Star 1999;
Oudshoorn 1999; Winner 1980), whereas the present
moment may require more attention to the fallacy of
technological veracity. The truth regimes of big data and
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sensing systems are always based on necessarily reductive
models of reality. Although they may “work” to bring
about effects based on unknown causal chains (Andre-
jevic 2013; Mayer-Sch€onberger and Cukier 2013), they
are accurate only to the extent that those models or rep-
resentations are imposed successfully back upon the
social systems they describe. Thus, “data doubles” of
individuals become problematic especially when institu-
tions make decisions based on those partial, limited, and
necessarily biased representations (Haggerty and Ericson
2000) or when people come to see themselves through
those identity constructs (Browne 2015). “Big data” rep-
resentations of reality do not at long last achieve positiv-
istic dreams of isomorphic correspondence between a
model and the world, yet their ramifications can be pro-
found if institutions internalize their logics and are trans-
formed in their likeness to privilege the classifiable and
calculable. Then again, beyond such academic observa-
tions about the limitations and politics of representation,
it must be acknowledged that many technological sys-
tems are deliberately built to lie.
In this article, I investigate a number of technological
systems that dissimulate by design. Examples can include
things like Volkswagen’s so-called clean diesel cars that
were equipped with software designed to fool emissions
testing by misrepresenting actual pollution released by
the vehicles when not being tested (Plumer 2015). Simi-
larly, many hotel and business thermostats are decoys
that give incorrect readings to occupants and provide a
false sense of individual control (Sandberg 2003). Casino
video slot machines are programmed to present a statisti-
cally improbable number of “near misses” and deliver
frequent small payouts to lend the impression that gam-
blers are winning even when they are losing badly (Sch€ull
2012). In a different vein, while mobile phones might
appear transparent in their functions, hidden apps can
allow parents (or others) to monitor their children’s loca-
tions, text messages, and calls, all without divulging that
functionality (e.g., TeenSafe 2015). The police also use
“Stingray” systems to spoof cell-phone towers so that
mobile phones provide users’ locations (and perhaps
more) without either the phone or the user having any
awareness of that action (Farivar 2014). Keystroke-track-
ing software and other workplace surveillance systems
operate in a similar way: seeming to respond solely to
workers, while actually communicating to managers
(Introna 2000; Kiss and Mosco 2005). Even some house-
hold devices such as smart televisions are recording
users’ viewing habits, facial features, and spoken words,
ostensibly to provide better service, but also to amass
potentially profitable data for companies (Harris 2015).
For the majority of cases, the term function creep is insuf-
ficient to describe these practices. The systems have not
simply been appropriated for uses that were not origi-
nally intended, but instead have multiple, simultaneous,
intentional functions of which not all users may be
aware.
Ranging from the seemingly mundane to the extraor-
dinary, together these examples illustrate some funda-
mental dimensions of “untrustworthy” systems. First,
most are polyvalent and polyvocal: They lend the out-
ward appearance of having a single primary function
and audience, but they in fact have multiple hidden func-
tions and audiences. Second, and related, especially in
their hidden functionalities, these are surveillance sys-
tems. Most are designed to generate information about
and facilitate control of users. For instance, things like
deceptive hotel thermostats are programmed to report
room occupancy to hotel management, at the same time
that they control the behavior of guests and forestall
complaints by implying that discomfort has no objective
external cause. Third, untrustworthy technologies are
commonplace and often legal. Thus, innovative privacy
activists have built similar spoofing systems that intro-
duce “noise” into databases to hinder user profiling
(Brunton and Nissenbaum 2011), and criminals might
deploy similar systems and tactics for financial gain (e.g.,
by using Trojan horses, phishing, pharming) (Whitson
and Haggerty 2008; Cole and Pontell 2006), whereas
untrustworthy systems should be seen as ordinary and
theorized as such.
The goal of this article, therefore, is to ask what can be
learned by approaching such systems not as aberrations
but as hidden articulations of normal technological
orders. The gap between expectation and actuality serves
as a space of politics, as a site for tracking shifting power
relationships and cultural norms, and also for contesting
those changes. If there are multiple scripts for each tech-
nological system, then transparency with regard to hid-
den functions could never serve as a corrective in itself
because the inherent politics and conflicts would neces-
sarily remain (Brucato 2015; Han 2015; Monahan
2015).1 Instead of focusing on whether a system is lying
or telling the truth, it is perhaps more important to ask
what growing technological practices of concealment say
about issues of surveillance and trust in society. Accept-
ing that technological veracity is always a fallacy and that
untrustworthiness is the norm for all technological sys-
tems could redirect attention to power inequalities and
the pressing question of how to live together ethically.
A detour through ritual and the dark side
To focus on the deceptive aspects of technologies alone
would suggest that they fail to communicate honestly
and sincerely. They intentionally withhold information
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or yield incorrect information, thereby fracturing the
communicative chain. However, the mechanistic trans-
mission model upon which this evaluation is based
ignores—or subordinates—the deeper cultural and social
aspects of communication. James Carey famously used
the term “ritual” to describe this different and arguably
more fundamental function of communication: “A ritual
view of communication is directed not toward the exten-
sion of messages in space but toward the maintenance of
society in time; not the act of imparting information but
the representation of shared beliefs” (Carey 1992, 18).
From this perspective, communication entails the ongo-
ing construction of the world through the creation and
deployment of symbolic forms. As such, communication
is also an inherently social and material endeavor, giving
rise to and dependent upon ideologies, subjectivities,
political economies, infrastructures, and organizational
forms (Gates and Magnet 2007; Leonardi 2012; Mumby
2005; Packer and Wiley 2012). Thus, instead of seeing
deceptive technologies as failing to transmit effectively,
one could seek to learn about the problematics of con-
temporary social and material worlds through the study
of such devices.
Better communication is often presented as the solu-
tion to just about any disagreement or antipathy, from
the level of tensions in romantic relationships all the way
to conflicts between nations. Failures to communicate
effectively, however, are both endemic and potentially
salutary. As John Durham Peters explains:
Why others do not use words as I do or do not feel or see
the world as I do is a problem not just in adjusting the
transmission and reception of messages, but in orches-
trating collective being, in making space in the world for
each other. Whatever “communication” might mean, it
is more fundamentally a political and ethical problem
than a semantic one.…The ultimate futility of our
attempts to “communicate” is not lamentable; it is a
handsome condition. (Peters 1999, 30–31)
As with the ritual view of communication, this orien-
tation implies that people should not aspire to eliminate
noise and difference, to perfect “the transmission and
reception of messages,” but instead see communication
as an ongoing and never complete “project of reconciling
self and other” (Peters 1999, 9). Misunderstanding, from
this view, signifies diverse human and cultural richness
and introduces untapped opportunities for communing
with others, for making the world a more just and
rewarding place. Romantic as this notion might be, it
does complicate interpretations of deceptive transmis-
sions and points toward the need for ethical and political
adjustments, not necessarily more accurate or truthful
systems.
Although such views of communication as ritual or cul-
ture might imply studies of collaborative symbolic practi-
ces, they can also afford inquiry into power differentials
and social inequalities (e.g., Sharma 2014; Couldry 2003),
especially if one takes a symmetrical approach and analyzes
dysfunction as similarly revealing of social orders. What
has been termed “the dark side” of communication could
assist with this investigation. As Spitzberg and Cupach
(2011b) describe, the dark side signifies a host of remark-
ably common uses of interpersonal communication for
purposes other than generously connecting or sharing with
others: bullying, threatening, deceiving, harassing, rejecting,
expressing anger, eliciting guilt, hurting feelings, and so on.
While the concentration is on the harmful, destructive, and
repulsive, such practices can also have “prosocial” inten-
tions or outcomes; for instance, lying is often seen as a way
to protect someone from the harm that the truth could
cause (Spitzberg and Cupach 2011b). Similarly, while
expressing anger might be socially coded as negative, it can
also bring about positive social or organizational changes
as people respond to it (Spitzberg and Cupach 2011b). For
these reasons, “the dark side [of communication] is shown
to be deeply concerned not only with dysfunction, but also
with social processes marked by functional and normative
ambivalence” (Spitzberg and Cupach 2011a, xiii).
What “ritual” and “dark side” treatments of commu-
nication share in common is the view that communica-
tion is a social and symbolic act that cannot be reduced
to mechanistic models of transmission. Communicative
failures or tensions are meaningful and call out for analy-
sis beyond surface observations of their existence. Tech-
nologies are also active participants in these dramas:
They embody the conditions and values of their creation,
structure the conditions for human action and interac-
tion, and acquire new meanings and purposes as others
negotiate them (Pfaffenberger 1992; Monahan 2010;
Slack and Wise 2005; Winner 1986). Taking inspiration
from John Durham Peters, deceptive communication
technologies can be read as both ubiquitous and conse-
quential, as presenting political and ethical challenges
that demand attention.
For your comfort
Digital thermostats for climate control systems present a
fruitful starting point for such analysis because of their
seeming innocuousness.2 Thermostats are prototypical
transparent technologies that present information about
one’s enclosed environment—typically temperature, but
also humidity or other variables—and enable user control
over heating, air conditioning, and ventilation (HVAC)
units designed to alter that environment. A breakdown in
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that feedback loop would usually be interpreted as techni-
cal malfunction or inability, not calculated deception.
However, especially in hotels or office spaces, thermostats
afford unseen manipulation of occupants and can cultivate
individual psychological insecurity if occupants come to
see their discomfort as ungrounded with no external rea-
son for it. Thermostats may serve as an outward symbol
of hospitality while having the opposite effect on func-
tional and experiential levels.
So-called smart thermostats and meters are advertised
for their energy and cost-saving abilities, as they predict
energy use, ration access to it, dynamically adjust to
needs, and eliminate what is perceived to be unnecessary
heating or cooling (e.g., of vacant rooms, floors, or build-
ings). Although there is some disagreement about the
effectiveness of such systems for reducing energy con-
sumption in less predictable settings, such as college
dorms (Woolley et al. 2014), the market for high-tech
“property management systems” and “energy manage-
ment systems” in the hospitality industry is clearly fueled
in part by a managerial desire for centralized, remote
observation and control, whether of properties, employ-
ees, or customers. As one vendor of such systems
explains:
We believe that one of the major factors in almost all
hotel environments is the lack of visibility your hotel
maintenance staff has into how your hotel HVAC
resources are performing. …We enable your Facilities
managers to see exactly what is going on in any area that
has our solution installed. (Pelican Wireless Systems
2011, online)
In this context, surveillance-based thermostats that
actively detect and adjust to room occupancy through
the use of motion sensors, door sensors, sound sensors,
CO2 sensors, and key-card detection systems are viewed
as essential management tools (Grochmal 2013;
Schneider Electric 2015). While the goal may be one of
complete transparency, the audience for such messages
is management, not occupants of those spaces, be they
customers or custodial staff.
As with other surveillance systems, visibility invites—or
cultivates a desire for—control through techniques of
intervention (Cohen 2008a; Staples 2014). One company
makes the connection between monitoring and active con-
trol explicit: “EvolveNet is Evolve Guest Controls’ software
that gives the front desk and engineering the ability to
monitor and control the lighting and temperature of each
room, wing, floor, or the entire facility remotely” (Hasek
2011, online). Observation and control can have direct
associations of detecting a specific problem and then
remotely addressing it, but the technological imperative
tends toward the creation of all-encompassing occupant
surveillance systems:
Through a secure IP address, users can easily scroll
though energy usage data by room, floor or even the
entire facility, with the ability to make manual adjust-
ments to settings when required. Millions of data points
are captured to create customized reports tailored to the
needs of your facility. Reports or alerts can also be sent
to a mobile device or inbox to enhance response time if
problems arise. (Schneider Electric 2010, online)
Although the aspiration may be predictive and
completely automated management of facilities, such as
initiating cooling once customers check in but before
they arrive at their room or turning the thermostat up
when people leave for the day, this invariably relies on
monitoring of occupants, especially through sensors, to
determine their presence or absence in rooms. It is about
watching and controlling people, and particularly their
interaction with and experience of the environment.
For this discussion, a key component of controlling
occupants in space is providing them with a semblance
of control, no matter how spurious that might be.
According to The Wall Street Journal, “HVAC experts
acknowledge what millions of office workers have sus-
pected all along: A lot of office thermostats are
completely fake—meant to dupe you into thinking
you’ve altered the office weather conditions” (Sandberg
2003, online). In their attempts to achieve verisimilitude,
engineers have even equipped thermostats with pneu-
matic devices so that they emit a completely ineffectual
but satisfying “hiss” when someone adjusts them (Arabe
2003). That sound is the communicative equivalent of a
sign index (Cobley 2001), such as smoke meaning fire,
except that it is a false one. Such placebo thermostats, as
with the numerous placebo buttons to request a “walk”
signal at pedestrian crosswalks, “close doors” in eleva-
tors, or “open doors” in subway cars (Baraniuk 2015;
Sandberg 2003), are intended to instill an “illusion of
control” in people so that they feel a sense of individual
empowerment and social solidarity with others around
them (Langer 1975). In terms of the dark side of commu-
nication, these devices may have the potential to achieve
psychological benefits through deceptive means. In hotel
or apartment contexts, thermostats tend to miscommu-
nicate in slightly different ways: they have a limited range
of adjustment, implying that such a range is sufficient for
most people, and they can be “calibrated” to display an
incorrect reading (CresendoCrook 2015). These design
features expertly achieve social control for most people
by combining insecurity (e.g., “It must just be me”) with
a false sense of ability.3
Deceptive thermostats reveal a great deal about indi-
vidual–institutional power imbalances, data imperatives,
and trust relationships. Through the use of these devices,
businesses tacitly assert the right to mislead, monitor,
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and control customers or employees in the name of per-
ceived efficiencies. By implementing placebo buttons,
temperature limits, and inaccurate readouts, manage-
ment evokes a sense of individual psychological insecu-
rity, executed through a kind of paternalistic obligation
to discipline individuals who might not set temperature
levels responsibly. By flagging these messages, I do not
aim to refute or affirm the position that individuals
would not behave rationally or responsibly. Rather, I
would like to draw attention to the ways that what is
considered rational and responsible becomes equated
with managerial data collection, oversight, and control,
which are then delegated to technological devices to
enforce. Moreover, as some hotel thermostats now have
“green” buttons that customers can push to voluntarily
submit to less comfortable, but ostensibly less wasteful,
temperature settings (Honeywell 2015; Baral 2012), it is
clear that such devices are being harnessed to transform
existing norms in overt ways. This will likely lead to even
greater inequalities in treatment, which happens already
when individuals on “budget” electricity plans are
charged higher rates or have their air-conditioning sys-
tems overridden remotely during peak heat spells (Gil-
liom and Monahan 2013). Through such surveillance
systems, a voluntary choice today can rapidly become a
demand unequally applied tomorrow.
Institutional malware
When individuals attempt to gain access surreptitiously
to one’s personal data for their own profit, it is typically
called identity theft. But beyond the well-publicized
threats of email phishing scams, credit card theft, and
system hacks resides a host of spyware applications cir-
culated by supposedly reputable institutional actors,
such as corporate workplaces, police agencies, and tech-
nology companies. Given the media-fueled moral panics
surrounding identity theft (Cole and Pontell 2006; Mon-
ahan 2009), it is instructive that the growing use of insti-
tutional malware receives such scant notice. Apparently,
deceptive technologies are subject to differential evalua-
tion and judgment based upon the relative status and
perceived agenda of the entity implementing them.
Workplaces represent one of the key sites for wide-
spread implementation of spyware. In the United States,
it is estimated that roughly 75 percent of employees are
electronically monitored at work, especially through
computer, mobile phone, and tablet applications (Ball
2010; Gilliom and Monahan 2013). This can include the
tracking of computer keystrokes, e-mails, chats, Web
browsing, phone conversations, physical location, mouse
clicks, and more. Although spyware companies and busi-
ness magazines recommend informing employees of
such practices, including providing information about
the scope of monitoring and clear guidelines for accept-
able and unacceptable behavior, many—and perhaps
most—companies do not do so (Alder, Ambrose, and
Noel 2006; Kiser, Porter, and Vequist 2010). As a result,
the systems that many employees use to perform their
work tasks are deceptive. They communicate functional-
ity that is directed by a single user, namely, the employee,
but in reality there are multiple users (managers, infor-
mation technology [IT] staff, auditors) who can access
performance data and personal communications at any
time.
In business literature and spyware marketing materi-
als, employee monitoring of this sort is discursively
framed as necessary, responsible action on the part of
companies. For instance, one PC World article argues:
Do you know what your employees are doing on the
Web? At a minimum, they’re probably goofing off
watching YouTube videos. At worst, they could be
steering your company toward financial ruin … gone
are the days when PC monitoring was an optional,
draconian security measure practiced only by espe-
cially vigilant organizations. Today, more than three-
quarters of U.S. companies monitor employee Inter-
net use. If your business is in the remaining quarter
that doesn’t do so, you’re probably overdue for a
policy change. (Strohmeyer 2011)
Spying on employees is presented as conscientious
management to increase productivity, avoid lawsuits,
and keep data secure (Strohmeyer 2011, online). In order
for this logic to hold, though, employees must simulta-
neously be perceived as untrustworthy and in need of
oversight. One spyware company, My Team Monitor,
communicates this through a promotional video that
depicts workers as monkeys who are closely watched and
carefully trained, through incentives for productivity
(bananas) or threats for idleness (angry gorillas) (My
Team Monitor 2013b). By dehumanizing workers in this
way, the video implies that workers are naturally unintel-
ligent and lazy, and therefore in need of a wise, diligent
trainer to ensure their success.
This viewpoint has a long pedigree in the history or
workplace surveillance, as Frederick Winslow Taylor, the
father of “scientific management,” told a similarly insult-
ing anecdote about a short, uneducated foreign laborer,
“Schmidt,” who supposedly eagerly increased his pro-
ductivity under a system of financial incentives (piece-
work) and managerial oversight. In Taylor’s words:
Now one of the very first requirements for a man who is
fit to handle pig-iron as a regular occupation is that he
shall be so stupid and so phlegmatic that he more nearly
resembles in his mental make-up the ox than any other
type. … He is so stupid that the word “percentage” has
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no meaning to him, and he must consequently be
trained by a man more intelligent than himself into the
habit of working in accordance with the laws of this sci-
ence before he can be successful. (Taylor 1911; cited in
Wrege and Perroni 1974, 17)
Although Schmidt, whose real name was Henry Noll
(Wrege and Perroni 1974), was aware of the observation
he was under, contemporary workers are visible in many
less obvious ways. As My Team Monitor recounts:
One of our most popular features is the employees’
screenshots. You can view screenshots taken throughout
a specific day and even flag screenshots containing non-
work-related activities. If you were looking for a bit
more detail, you can view an activity chart, which logs
your employees’ working time, key presses, and mouse
clicks. (My Team Monitor 2013a, video)
Additionally, workers may be constructed as dumb or
lazy, whereas managers are presented as hard-working,
analytically capable individuals who deserve to monitor
others as a form of leisure akin to watching a sports
game at home. Thus, another company, InterGuard,
offers a marketing video that depicts a manager, in ani-
mated form, sitting tilted back in a chair with his hands
behind his head watching a computer monitor displaying
his workers’ activity. The voice-over says, “Instead of
monitoring systems, InterGuard records users at the end
point, which is where the critical action takes place. It’s
like having surveillance cameras installed in your PCs, so
you get to see everything that happens just as clearly as
watching a replay” (InterGuard 2015, online). Deceptive
workplace technologies clearly rely on the creation and
circulation of simplistic, yet effective, identity constructs
that normalize unequal treatment and rights.
Beyond workplaces, many parents spy on children,
and intimate partners (or ex-partners) spy on each other
with surprising regularity (Gregg 2013; Marx and Steeves
2010; Mason and Magnet 2012). In one disturbing devel-
opment, though, police agencies throughout the United
States have had a hand in purchasing and distributing to
parents hundreds of thousands of copies of a malware
program called ComputerCOP (Maass 2014). The stated
goal of this program is to help parents monitor their
children’s use of the Internet, including Web browsing,
e-mailing, and chatting, to protect them from online
predators. In actuality, the program relies on an incredi-
bly vulnerable keystroke monitoring function that does
not discriminate between adult or child users and intro-
duces a host of data vulnerabilities, perhaps exposing
users to the very threats it purports to block. According
to the Electronic Frontier Foundation, which conducted
an investigation into ComputerCOP, the keystroke mon-
itoring function:
could place a family’s personal information at extreme
risk by transmitting what a user types over the Internet
to third-party servers without encryption. That means
many versions of ComputerCOP leave children (and
their parents, guests, friends, and anyone using the
affected computer) exposed to the same predators, iden-
tity thieves, and bullies that police claim the software
protects against. (Maass 2014, online)
The software itself is deceptive in the sense that child
or adult users may be unaware that by using their com-
puter they are simultaneously generating data for a hid-
den surveillance application on the computer. Although
a technologically savvy user might come to the same
conclusion about most Internet applications and web-
sites, the difference here is that family members are the
ones installing the application, with encouragement
from law enforcement, to spy on—and potentially
endanger—their loved ones.
ComputerCOP is deceptive in other ways too. The
company claims false endorsements from the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the U.S. Department
of Treasury and references a long-expired endorsement
from the National Center for Missing and Exploited
Children (Maass 2014). The reason for its remarkable
success, including its purchase by hundreds of police
agencies in 35 states (at up to $42,000 per agency), has to
do with its tailored marketing to police agencies looking
for positive public relations fodder and legal ways to
spend funds obtained from seized assets and other sour-
ces (Maass 2014). By buying thousands of copies of the
software to distribute to their communities for free,
police agencies receive branded versions of the software
that advertise the specific agency and can even include a
photograph of the local police chief (Maass 2014). This
can obviously boost the reputation of police agencies and
assist chiefs with reelection, regardless of how ineffective
or dangerous the software may be.
As one final example of everyday institutional mal-
ware, the software company Adobe released in 2014 a
version of its e-reader, “Digital Editions,” that siphoned
up information about users’ reading habits and sent it to
Adobe. This happened without the consent of users and
without disclosure by Adobe. Anyone using the e-reader
unwittingly revealed the titles of books they opened, the
number of pages read, and the time spent reading (Quin-
tin 2014). More than that, metadata were collected on all
the books in users’ libraries and on any connected e-
book readers, such as Nook, Kindle, or Boyue, even if
Adobe Digital Editions never opened those books (Quin-
tin 2014). This practice was deceptive in the general way
that most websites or digital rights management (DRM)
systems are: They hide the fact that they are surveillant.
But Adobe circulated privacy statements that were
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definitively false, claiming, for instance, that information
collected pertained only to “the eBook currently being
read by the user and not for any other eBook in the user’s
library or read/available in any other reader” (Quintin
2014, online). The final coup de gra^ce was that Adobe
was sending these private and potentially sensitive data
in unencrypted plain text format over the Internet. As
Nate Hoffelder, who is the person who brought these
revelations to light, explained: “Adobe is not only logging
what users are doing, they’re also sending those logs to
their servers in such a way that anyone running one of
the servers in between can listen in and know every-
thing” (Hoffelder 2014, online).
Adobe responded to the negative feedback gener-
ated by these revelations by releasing an updated ver-
sion of the e-reader. This new version appeared to
solve the problems by ensuring that data were
encrypted and sent over secure servers, as well as
ceasing the collection of data not relevant to DRM
checks (Quintin 2014). However, it remains unclear
whether Adobe engaged in the initial privacy violation
intentionally. What is certain is that the data were
not being collected to improve services for users, but
instead were intended to “facilitate the implementa-
tion of different licensing models by publishers”
(Quintin 2014). Users’ data, in essence, were being
captured and traded as valuable commodities without
the awareness or remuneration of users. Similar dis-
coveries have also been made about LG Smart Televi-
sions, which collected and insecurely downloaded
metadata on owners’ viewing habits (Cushing 2013;
Hoffelder 2014), so these practices are poised to con-
tinue, in some form or another, because the technical
systems enable it, data markets encourage it, and reg-
ulators tend to ignore it (Cohen 2012; Pasquale 2015).
These examples of institutional malware illustrate
how power asymmetries between institutional actors and
individuals have the effect of normalizing deception on
the part of the relatively powerful. When businesses or
police agencies insist on using malware applications, it is
done under the banners of sound business management
(with workplace surveillance) or necessary public safety
(with police-distributed software). Even Adobe’s e-reader
fiasco, which was illegal and patently unethical, under-
scores the dominant logics of the technology industry:
toward surreptitiously collecting and trading user data
for financial gain, while hiding behind official rationales
of improving services and protecting intellectual prop-
erty (Arditi 2013; Cohen 2008b; Pasquale 2015). People
face greater privacy risks from institutions than from
individual criminals (Monahan 2010; Regan 2003), yet
other than high-profile disclosures such as dragnet sur-
veillance by the National Security Agency (Lyon 2015),
deceptive surveillance on the part of institutions is sel-
dom discussed or problematized.
Decoys in the data hunt
Trashcans on the street. Phone booths on the corner.
Planes flying overhead. In the emerging world of
smart cities and the Internet of things, everyday
objects are much more than they seem. As with other
deceptive technologies, it is not simply the case that
these artifacts cease to function in their assumed role.
Rather, they use their outward appearance and
assumed singular functionality as decoys to enmesh
people in surveillance encounters. As with the best of
decoys, most people are unaware of the dissimulation
and fail to see the extent to which their data are
being captured.
Although homes are increasingly populated with
smart gadgets that can report sensitive personal informa-
tion (Fitchett and Lim 2008; Morozov 2013), in public
places it is typically mobile phones that promiscuously
connect with other devices to reveal the identity or habits
of individuals. For example, in 2013 trash bins in London
managed by the advertising company Renew were
equipped with WiFi receivers to invisibly capture the
unique identification information of all mobile phones in
the area. The capturing system, called Presence Orb, cat-
alogued phone make, serial number, signal strength, and
speed of movement, enabling the company to identify
patterns in individual behavior over time (Campbell-
Dollaghan 2013). Renew’s chief executive officer (CEO)
boasted, “We will cookie the street” (CBS/AP 2013),
which is an allusion to the way that websites track indi-
viduals and their browsing habits over time by installing
hidden “cookies” of computer code on users’ machines.
In a single week of testing, Renew was able to track
“more than four million devices … peaking at 946,016
devices detected in a single day. And that’s just from 12
Orb-enabled trash cans in central London” (Campbell-
Dollaghan 2013, online). The ultimate goal will be to
determine fine-grained behavioral patterns of individu-
als—such as where they shop, which trains they take,
when they get lunch—so that Renew could sell access to
those data for other companies to deliver customized ads
to pedestrians (Campbell-Dollaghan 2013). After a pub-
lic backlash concerning the testing of such “spy bins,”
the City of London Corporation, which manages the
area in question, claimed that it was completely unaware
and did not approve of the data collection, so it ordered
Renew to shut them down (CBS/AP 2013).
The company Titan360 deployed a similar system in
New York City with hundreds of public payphones
displaying its ads. The payphones were equipped with
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hidden “smartphone-sniffing beacons” that detected
Bluetooth apps on people’s phones and sent tailored
ads to them (Dwoskin 2014). For instance, when indi-
viduals downloaded the Tribeca Film Festival app, if
they passed by a Titan360 phone booth, they would be
sent information about other films screening near
them (Dwoskin 2014). The partnering company, Gim-
bal, then drew upon this expanded network of beacons
to approach local businesses and sell access to cell
phone users in their radius (Dwoskin 2014). Although
the Titan360 system apparently collected less data
than the Renew trash bins, the city was similarly
unaware of the practice. In Titan360’s case, the com-
pany lied to the city about the functionality, saying
that the beacons would be used solely for maintenance
purposes—to alert employees when to change outdated
ads (Dwoskin 2014). After the city ordered the com-
pany to cease collecting mobile phone data, as well as
selling to advertisers access to mobile phone users,
Titan360’s Executive Vice President admitted, “We
overstepped,” and claimed that it was simply the result
of a misunderstanding (Dwoskin 2014).
Law enforcement is also actively collecting mobile
phone data by covert means. In vehicles and airplanes
across the United States, police agencies have installed
International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) catchers
to scoop up unique identifying information and locations
of all mobile phones in the area. The systems work by
mimicking cell phone towers with the strongest possible
signal strength, even though they are not cell towers nor
do they actually have the strongest signal (Barrett 2014).
By dint of mobile phone protocols, this forces all proxi-
mate phones to connect to the IMSI catcher and commu-
nicate their data, unknown to the owner, before being
cycled off to an actual cell tower. The effect is compara-
ble to what is known as a “man in the middle” form of
computer hacking, where “a person’s electronic device is
tricked into thinking it is relaying data to a legitimate or
intended part of the communications system” (Barrett
2014, online). Moreover, the ability exists for such sys-
tems to jam cellular signals or download phone data
(e.g., e-mail, contacts, photographs), although it is
unknown whether police agencies have exploited this
functionality (Barrett 2014). While thoroughly deceptive,
the systems are attractive to law enforcement because
they circumvent telecommunication companies alto-
gether, so there is no need to partner with them or obtain
warrants to request information from them (Barrett
2014). That said, the systems are probably illegal—as the
ACLU has argued—because they collect data on every-
one in their territory, whether or not they are making a
phone call, including people in private spaces such as
buildings or houses, not just people under investigation
(Gillum, Sullivan, and Tucker 2015; RT.com 2014). Even
for people under investigation, there is evidence that
police do not obtain probable-cause warrants for the use
of IMSI catchers (Zetter 2014).
The IMSI catcher that has received the most attention
to date is called Stingray (Farivar 2014). Police agencies
across the United States rely on them, but it is incredibly
difficult to obtain details because they obfuscate by deny-
ing such use or insist that any information about their use
is confidential or classified. Regardless, the ACLU has
been able to confirm their deployment by “60 agencies in
23 states and the District of Columbia” (American Civil
Liberties Union 2015, online). It has been reported that
the Chicago Police Department has used Stingray systems
to listen to the voice calls of activists, too (Handley 2014).
In one remarkable case, public records indicated that the
police department in Sarasota, FL, had used Stingrays at
least 200 times without obtaining any judicial approval
because “the device’s manufacturer made the police
department sign a non-disclosure agreement that police
claim prevented them from disclosing use of the device to
the courts” (Zetter 2014, online). After the ACLU received
legal approval to review the police department’s Stingray-
related documents, the federal U.S. Marshals Service, in
an unprecedented move, confiscated them at the last min-
ute and refused to allow such access (Doctorow 2014).
The ACLU summarized the move: “We’ve seen our fair
share of federal government attempts to keep records
about stingrays secret, but we’ve never seen an actual
physical raid on state records in order to conceal them
from public view” (Zetter 2014, online).4
More powerful than Stingrays, though, are air-
plane-mounted IMSI catchers known as “dirtboxes.”
According to one report, by flying over urban areas,
“the technology in the two-foot-square device enables
investigators to scoop data from tens of thousands of
cellphones in a single flight, collecting their identify-
ing information and general location” (Barrett 2014,
online). Evidence suggests that the FBI is the primary
agency conducting such surveillance flights, which
include high-resolution video and photographic sur-
veillance as well, with more than 100 planes flying
over 30 cities across the country (Gillum, Sullivan,
and Tucker 2015). As discovered through investigative
journalism by the Associated Press, the FBI has gone
to great lengths to keep the flights secret, including
establishing at least 13 shell companies with different
names and no physical location to mislead curious
individuals (Gillum, Sullivan, and Tucker 2015). The
planes were even used to monitor Black Lives Matter
activists in Baltimore, MD, who were protesting the
death of Freddie Gray while in police custody (Gil-
lum, Sullivan, and Tucker 2015), which would appear
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to be an infringement on First Amendment-protected
freedom of speech and assembly.
IMSI-catcher systems like Stingrays and dirtboxes
weave multiple webs of deception. First, without
close scrutiny, they appear to be ordinary vehicles or
airplanes in the world. Second, airplanes are regis-
tered to shell companies to jumble any paper trail
that could identify their true function. Third, their
technical protocols mislead mobile phones into
thinking that they are connecting to regular cellular
towers and that those towers are transmitting the
strongest signal. Fourth, records about IMSI systems
are hidden from public scrutiny, sometimes through
extreme means, while authorities deny the existence
or extent of such systems. Fifth, police claim to
obtain necessary warrants for such surveillance, but
records show that they interpret nondisclosure
agreements with technology vendors as superseding
legal requirements for police investigations.
Although all communication devices may have built-
in deceptive valences, in this case a great deal of
labor goes into accentuating those functions and
ensuring that they remain obscured.
The systems just reviewed illustrate some facets of
what this section referred to as “the data hunt.” The hunt
metaphor may be a useful one for thinking about the var-
ious tricks deployed and justified by institutional actors
for securing data on individuals and on entire popula-
tions. Although there has been some pushback on these
decoy systems, they do seem to be unrolling persistently
and slowly becoming the norm.5 It is important to
remember that while data may be those that are pursued,
those data reference individuals and can be used to assert
forms of surveillant control over them, to modulate
behavior, to discipline, and to punish. As Gregoire Cha-
mayou (2012) argues, the pastoral power theorized by
Michel Foucault was always coupled with the dehuman-
izing power of manhunts, which sought to capture or
expel those marked as out of place, be they deviant, poor,
or other. Chamayou writes, “Whereas pastoral power
guides and accompanies a multiplicity in movement,
cynegetic power extends itself, on the basis of a territory
of accumulation, over a space of capture” (Chamayou
2012, 16). The decoy trash bins, phone booths, and air-
planes each overlay a grid over territory and establish a
field for the hunt—of potential consumers or suspected
criminals. Following Chamayou, though, we can say that
these decoys also reinforce a set of political prerogatives:
whether toward a digital enclosure that reduces techno-
logical possibility to commercial interests (Andrejevic
2007) or toward the assertion of police and state domina-
tion (Wall 2013). The hunt for data becomes itself a kind
of violence against the possible.
Conclusion
This article has argued that deceptive communication
systems are hidden articulations of normal technological
orders. They are polyvalent and polyvocal; they are ori-
ented toward surveillance and control, especially in their
hidden functions; and they are commonplace and often
legal. The examples reviewed here range from the seem-
ingly pedestrian installation of untrustworthy hotel and
workplace thermostats, to widespread and troubling
cases of surveillance of computer activity, to the appar-
ently extreme collection of mobile phone metadata by
private companies and law enforcement agencies. If one
approaches these examples not as isolated cases but
instead as significant indicators of technological trends
more broadly, then responses or correctives should be
more encompassing.
If deception in itself is not the primary problem with
such systems, or with communication more broadly,
then transparency alone cannot be the solution. A call
for greater transparency could be akin to quests to eradi-
cate noise from transmission systems in the belief that
pure communication could be approximated and that it
could produce rational responses that curtailed abuse. In
short, calls for transparency may unwittingly ignore the
ritualistic dimensions of technologies and the inescap-
able politics of all communicative acts. As troubling as
institutional opacity might be, more fundamental prob-
lems revealed by deceptive systems are imbalances in
power and widespread acquiescence to corporate and
state efforts to control individuals, groups, and their
data. The issues are about rights claimed by institutions
through technological means without significant contes-
tation by publics, which is a dynamic that effectively
legitimizes such control practices, along with corporate
and state ownership of data collected through them.
Therefore, the most pressing imperative is not necessar-
ily to choose different systems, but instead to change the
field upon which they are cast.
Notes
1. It should also be noted that transparency is a value-laden
concept that in practice often privileges the relatively
white and affluent while designating others as opaque and
therefore dangerous (Hall 2015).
2. As banal as thermostats and climate control systems
might appear, those without access to them face greater
health risks, especially in extreme weather situations
(Rogot et al. 1992; Poulter 2012), and reliance on them
could contribute greatly to costly energy expenditures and
destructive climate change (Oatman 2015; Rosenthal and
Lehren 2012).
3. As evidence that not everyone is as compliant, a number
of websites offer suggestions for hacking standard
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thermostats to afford a wider range of user discretion over
temperature settings (e.g., Henry 2013).
4. In 2015, the U.S. Department of Justice changed its policy
to require federal agents to obtain a warrant before
deploying Stingray devices, but this policy change does
not apply to local or state police forces (Fandos 2015).
5. This trend can be witnessed with related applications like
Apple’s iBeacon, which allows businesses to identify,
track, and advertise to potential customers through their
mobile phones (Ranger 2014).
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